The defendant argues that the trial court properly relied on Warner v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., supra, 2 Conn.App. 729, to conclude that she owed no fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries until there was ascertainable property in the trust, which the defendant takes to mean after the estate has settled. We find Warner in apposite. The court in Warner identified the central issue on appeal as whether the testamentary trust in that case had come into existence at all, and the court concluded that it had not. Id., 732. Its holding that the defendant trustee owed no duty to the trust beneficiaries rests on that premise. In the absence of an existing trust, the court concluded, the trustee had not accepted the trusteeship. Id., 734. Implicit in the court's reasoning was that, because the trust had not yet come into existence, and, therefore, there was no acceptance of the trust, the trustee's duties had not yet commenced. See id., 732-33. Unlike the trust at issue in Warner, the trust in the present case undisputedly exists and has held assets; indeed, the defendant herself, as a trustee, has made fourteen distributions to the beneficiaries totaling $976,600 over the year.
In the Barash case, the trust in question most certainly existed and the trustee had accepted appointment. The trust most certainly had a claim on the estate's assets, as opposed to a trustee who takes over as trustee of an inter vivos trust during the settlor's lifetime where the settlor has not transferred all of her assets into the trust.The defendant also contends that she lacked any power-and, therefore, any duty-to take action with respect to the residuary assets because they were in Rubinow's control and had not been conveyed by him to the trust. This argument misses the point. Although the defendant's lack of legal title to the residuary assets obviously rendered her powerless to collect any income from those assets or to distribute that income to the trust beneficiaries, these circumstances do not relieve the trustee of her duty to take reasonable steps to protect and collect the trust's interests in the residuary assets, after appropriate inquiry and investigation, and then to pursue a claim or other relief against the executor if required by the standard of care applicable to her position as trustee. The fact that an executor controls the estate assets while the estate remains open is the very circumstance that triggers a trustee's duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the executor exercises that control in a manner consistent with the interests of the trust and its beneficiaries. A trustee has powers coterminous with her duties in this respect.
The Court further explained:The obligation of the testamentary trustee to take reasonable steps to obtain property improperly detained by an executor is merely a specific application of the more general principle that a trustee has a duty to protect the rights and interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. See, e.g., In re Herrmann, 127 A.D.2d 999, 1000, 512 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1987); see also 3 A. Scott et al., Scott and Ascher on Trusts (5th Ed. 2007) § 17.9, p. 1222 ("a trustee who fails to take reasonable steps to enforce a claim against the executor or a previous trustee, to compel them to turn over property, or to redress a breach of trust, is ordinarily liable for any resulting loss" (emphasis added)). This principle applies with equal force when a will contains a testamentary disposition for the purpose of adding property to an inter vivos trust, such as in the present case. The precise manner in which the trust is created-by will or inter vivos-does not determine whether the trustee has a duty to protect and collect estate assets in which the trust holds a beneficial interest. When an inter vivos trust is a beneficiary of a will, the trustee has a duty to pursue reasonable claims on behalf of the trust against the executor of the estate. See 3 A. Scott et al, supra, § 17.7, pp. 1212-15; id., § 17.9, pp. 1220-24.
A Florida case from 2021 did hold out the possibility that an estate planning attorney had an obligation to fund a settlor's revocable trust during life. The apparently fluid nature of the obligation to fund a revocable trust bears watching.